Water Quality Trading in the Presence of Abatement Cost Sharing

November 16, 2011

Abstract
This paper examines how water quality trading interacts with nonpoint-source abatement cost
sharing (e.g., as currently practiced by the National Resource Conservation Service through
its Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP)) to promote the participation of nonpoint sources in a water quality market; participation that has thus far been noticeably lacking
nationwide. As such, an idealized version of water quality trading is envisioned, where water
quality trading and nonpoint cost sharing are treated as complementary policy instruments
rather than substitutes. Toward this end, the subgame-perfect equilibrium concept is used to
model a “multilateral contracting” relationship between the regulatory authority and nonpoint
sources when the regulator has incomplete information about the nonpoint sources’ production
costs. We characterize ex ante (or second-best) nonpoint abatement levels when the regulator
chooses cost-share rates in concert with a water quality market. Numerical analysis indicates
that current EQIP cost-share rates would likely be lower and more ﬂexibly determined in the
presence of water quality trading.
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Introduction

The eﬃcacy of incentives contracts for resolving asymmetric information problems is by now well
understood. Generally speaking, the principal (or regulator) pays the agent(s) an informational
rent in order to procure a desired (typically ex ante) outcome (Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993). In the
case of multilateral contracting, e.g., a single regulator contracting with two or more agents, the
procurement problem extends beyond controlling a single agent’s decision problem to designing a
game that accounts for the agents’ interactions with each other (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005).1
The problem also extends to symmetric (or common) uncertainty regarding nature and the absence
of a unique dominant strategy equilibrium. This paper considers a multilateral contracting problem
where (1) the agents have hidden information about their respective production costs, (2) the
regulator is endowed with the authority to subsidize the agents’ costs, and (3) the agents trade
their product in a quantity-constrained market.2
A good example of this type of game is the idealized control of nonpoint-source (NPS) water
pollution in the US through water quality trading (WQT) in the presence of existing NPS abatement cost subsidies. We say “idealized” because to date few successful WQT markets have been
established in the US for watersheds that include predominantly NPSs (Breetz, et al., 2004; King
and Kuch, 2003; Environomics, 1999; Hoag and Hughes-Popp, 1997; King, 2005; Ribaudo, 2001).
Therefore, to promote WQT among NPSs, it may be that policy instruments such as abatement
cost subsidization need to be used in a complementary fashion with – rather than as substitutes for
– WQT. Since the passage of the 1972 and 1977 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
(the Clean Water Act), approximately 34,000 of the US’s water bodies have either remained or
become non-compliant with the amendments’ standards for drinking water, contact recreation, or
aquatic life support (EPA, 2005). The main factor contributing to this noncompliance is “loading”
of nutrient- and pesticide-based pollutants from agricultural NPSs, e.g., crop and feedlot operations, through natural runoﬀ and leaching processes (Freeman, 2002; EPA, 2011b). Control of NPS
loadings, particularly in agricultural-based watersheds, is therefore a crucial determinant of whether
1

For a concise overview of the mechanism design problem see Mas-Colell, et al. (1995, Chapter 23).
As described in the next section, to address this multifacited problem we adopt the subgame-perfect equilibrium
concept, which solves a two-stage game between the agents and the regulator. In the ﬁrst stage of the game the
regulator chooses a ﬁxed cost-share (i.e., subsidy) rate and an initial production allocation for each agent. Given
the regulator’s choices the agents then choose their preferred production allocations, and therefore how much of the
product to trade in the second stage of the game.
2
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compliance with the Clean Water Act will ultimately be achieved on a broad scale nationwide.
WQT is premised on the notion that sources within a given watershed (both point and nonpoint)
face diﬀerent abatement cost structures. Assuming these cost diﬀerences are divergent enough, and
that a given source’s abatement level can be estimated with a reasonable amount of certainty, the
overall control costs of meeting a given watershed-wide pollution standard can be minimized if
sources facing relatively low control costs eﬀectively abate at levels in excess of their respective,
required (or regulated) abatement levels and then sell their excess abatement “credits” to relatively
high-cost sources in a formal WQT market. To date, however, the involvement of NPSs in WQT has
been virtually non-existent in the US, even in spite of the potential for the National Resource Conservation Service’s (NRCS’s) existing best management practice (BMP) subsidy program, known
as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), to stimulate an interest in trading by
eﬀectively reducing NPS abatement costs and thus engendering cost divergence between NPSs and
point sources in a given watershed.3
This paper characterizes one possible solution to the lack of NPS involvement in WQT in the
US by examining how a regulator might ideally subsidize BMPs. As demonstrated in Sections
2 and 3, our characterization is ideal in the sense that it (1) assumes WQT and abatement cost
subsidization can be used as complementary policy instruments, (2) requires enough information
about individual NPS abatement costs within a given watershed to estimate continuous marginal
cost functions, and (3) similarly requires enough information about the watershed’s topography,
soil types, and hydrology to estimate NPS loadings and delivery ratios (or transfer coeﬃcients).4
It also assumes the regulator can choose cost-share rates on an individual NPS basis in an eﬀort to
minimize the costs associated with meeting an environmental standard. This seemingly innocuous
assumption concerning the breadth of the regulator’s choice set in determining NPS-speciﬁc costshare rates is at odds with historical evidence in the US. Since the program’s inception, EQIP
cost-share rates as incurred by the NRCS) have traditionally been set by individual states (or
3

EQIP was reauthorized in the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 to inter alia provide ﬁnancial and
technical assistance in support of BMP implementation on eligible agricultural land (NRCS, 2006). This program
represents one of only two federal programs currently in place nationwide to encourage voluntary control of nonpoint
pollution. The other program is the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) administered through the US Department
of Agriculture. Obviously, regulatory reform of EQIP would be required before it could be used in tandem with
WQT.
4
While the appropriateness of the second assumption remains an open question, the suitability of the third
assumption is becoming less so over time. We discuss this issue further in Section 2.2.
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in some cases, counties within states) at ﬁxed levels across all NPSs, with ﬁxed caps on total
funding, total acreage, or total years (NRCS, 2011a).5 For example, in Illinois the subsidy rate
for BMPs “not related to livestock” is ﬁxed at 60 or 70 percent (75 percent for limited-resource
farmers), with a 400-acre limit on certain practices. The rate for conﬁned livestock operations and
grazing land applications is ﬁxed at 50, 60, or 70 percent (75 percent for limited-resource farmers)
(NRCS, 2011b). In contrast, the model presented in this paper provides a clear economic rationale
for endowing the regulator with complete ﬂexibility in choosing its cost-share rates for individual
NPSs.
Although the economic literature on NPS pollution is quite extensive, it has until recently focused almost exclusively on the use of penalty schemes such as taxation and ﬁnes that account
for the uncertainty of NPS loadings.6 A nascent strand of this literature has also investigated the
properties of WQT as a potential NPS control mechanism.7 The main focus of this literature has
been to identify optimal trading ratios between NPSs and point sources that incorporate loading
uncertainty. To our knowledge, the role of subsidization of BMPs in fostering an eﬃcient allocation
of NPS abatement eﬀort via WQT has been explored in only one previous paper - Horan et al.
(2004).8 In light of recent recognition by a host of WQT practitioners concerning the potential
synergies between BMP subsidization and WQT (see for instance Kramer (2003), National Association of Conservation Districts (2003), Hall and Raﬃni (2005), and Breetz and Fisher-Vanden
(2007)), this lack of attention in the literature seems particularly glaring.
Horan et al. (2004) call the complementary BMP subsidization/WQT policy described above
“double-dipping,” and show under what circumstances double-dipping enhances the eﬃciency of
5

In Section 2 we deﬁne cost-share rate as the rate incurred by a given NPS, which is one minus the rate incurred
by the regulator, solely for expository convenience.
6
Good overviews of this literature are provided in Shortle and Horan (2001) and Tomasi, et al. (1994).
7
As Shortle and Horan (2001) point out, NPS participation in a WQT market can be based on point-source
emissions for NPS input trading or point-source emissions for NPS estimated-loadings trading. In this paper, we
focus on the latter. More recent papers related to Shortle and Horan (2001) include Shortle and Horan (2005) and
Farrow, et al. (2005).
8
Isik and Sohngen (2003) consider voluntary, performance-based contracts between point and nonpoint sources to
reduce joint loadings, where incentive problems are controlled through joint liability and peer pressure/monitoring.
Pushkarskaya (2003) investigates an alternative performance-based mechanism that closely resembles the mechanism
discussed in this paper. In Pushkarskaya’s case, the regulator’s payment to an association of NPSs is not in the
form of a cost-share subsidy. Rather, it is a lump-sum payment that increases with the group’s abatement level.
The association – which is constrained by the hidden actions of its members – subsequently decides on an optimal
transfer mechanism. Absent from Pushkarskaya’s model is a WQT market, which in this paper’s model is the vehicle
through which NPSs obtain surplus (proﬁt). In Pushkarskaya’s case, the association’s surplus is created directly via
the regulator’s payment.
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NPS control. They ﬁnd that a coordinated policy approach, where cost-sharing rates and WQT
parameters are set jointly and simultaneously by the regulator (as they are in this paper), outperforms an uncoordinated approach, where the cost-sharing rates are set ﬁrst and taken as given
when setting the trading parameters. While Horan et al. (2004) focus on the individual NPS’s
tradeoﬀ between accepting a BMP subsidy and the amount of permits it subsequently has for sale
(i.e., the case of endogenously determined, partial double-dipping at the NPS level), this paper
focuses on the implications of the (information-asymmetric) relationship between the regulator and
the NPS when the NPS fully double-dips. Both papers’ results point to the advantages of a joint
policy when it comes to promoting the participation of NPSs in programs aimed at controlling NPS
nutrient loading.
In this paper, we characterize an ex ante (or second-best) solution (i.e., a solution to the
incomplete-information problem concerning the NPS abatement eﬀorts) that arises as a result of
cost-sharing in concert with WQT. The extent to which the corresponding ﬁrst-best solution (i.e.,
the solution to the full-information problem concerning the NPSs’ abatement eﬀorts) is constrained
by hidden production cost information is demonstrated both analytically and numerically. These
solutions focus primarily on the relationship between the regulator and the NPSs, since common
practice is for the regulator to subsidize solely NPS abatement, not the abatement eﬀorts of point
sources. As such, the solutions we present in this paper are not socially eﬃcient in the broader
context of a WQT market. They may instead be considered constrained socially eﬃcient (which
we nevertheless refer to as ﬁrst best), where the constraint reﬂects the restriction on the regulator’s
authority over NPSs, in particular its cost-sharing authority. Although our theoretical approach is
premised on the notion of an ideal relationship as it might exist between the regulator and NPSs
in the US, the main issues addressed jointly in the paper – cost-sharing and pollution trading – are
pertinent to WQT markets as they might arise anywhere in the world. Our overriding goal is to
characterize NPS cost-sharing and WQT as a joint policy; a policy reﬂecting some of the realities
of current regulatory practice (i.e., the setting of ﬁxed cost-share rates solely for NPSs) as well as
the ideal of a possible joint policy.
The next section lays out the basic contracting model describing the interaction between the
regulator and the NPSs, which in turn interact with each other and with point sources in a WQT
market. Analytical solutions to the model are provided for both the ﬁrst- and second-best problems.
4

Because the analytical solutions are cumbersome, Section 3 solves the model numerically in order
to provide estimates of the relative values of key variables. Section 4 summarizes the paper’s main
ﬁndings.
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Water Quality Trading and Abatement Cost Sharing

2.1

First-Best Benchmark

For ease of exposition, we assume a watershed is comprised of two NPSs, denoted 1 and 2. There
also exists a point source, denoted 𝑃 . NPSs 1 and 2 interact with the regulator and with 𝑃 in the
following two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, the regulator sets the NPSs’ respective cost-share rates,
𝛽1 and 𝛽2 , 0 ≤ 𝛽𝑗 ≤ 1, 𝑗 = 1, 2, i.e., the proportions of total abatement cost borne by the NPSs
themselves. The assumption of ﬁxed cost-share rates set solely for the NPSs and not for the point
source is reﬂective of current regulatory practice in the US, e.g., the NRCS’s EQIP for NPS’s. The
regulator also sets initial abatement allocations 𝑎
¯1 ≥ 0 and 𝑎
¯2 ≥ 0 for the NPSs, respectively, and
𝑎
¯𝑃 ≥ 0 for 𝑃 , which is reﬂective of the role a regulator would be required to play if a WQT program
were to be implemented.9 In essence, the regulator oﬀers NPS 𝑗 speciﬁc contract (𝛽𝑗 , 𝑎
¯𝑗 ), 𝑗 = 1, 2
and the point source 𝑃 speciﬁc contract (¯
𝑎𝑃 ).
In the second stage, the NPSs and point source engage in competitive WQT by selecting their
respective abatement eﬀorts, 𝑎1 , 𝑎2 , and 𝑎𝑃 , respectively, and thus their abatement credits available
for sale(in need of purchase), 𝑎𝑗 − 𝑎
¯𝑗 > (<)0, 𝑗 = 1, 2, and 𝑎𝑃 − 𝑎
¯𝑃 > (<)0, whichever the case may
be. The assumption of price-taking behavior implies 1 and 2 are either “representative agents” of
the two main types of NPSs present in a wider market, or, as the only existing NPSs, they are
induced to price competitively by regulatory policy. Further, the price-taking assumption naturally
rules out strategic behavior among the NPSs.10
As a result of “moving” after the regulator, the NPSs take their respective subsidy rates and
initial allocations as given (as does the point source with respect to its initial allocation). However,
9

In reality, the NRCS would not be responsible for setting the initial abatement allocations for WQT. Instead,
this responsibility would lie with state-level department(s) of environmental quality (DEQs), or with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) itself. In the context of our model, the regulatory authority might therefore
best be interpreted as a joint agency, incorporating both the NRCS and EPA. This joint agency fully characterizes
the relationship between NPS polluters and the regulatory authority.
10
For analysis of imperfectly competitive permit markets see Liski and Montero (2006), Cason et al. (2003),
Atkinson and Tietenberg (2001), and Hahn (1984).
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by moving ﬁrst the regulator is able to anticipate the eﬀects that its choices of the subsidy rates
and initial allocations have on the NPSs’ subsequent abatement eﬀorts (i.e., the NPSs’ respective “response functions”) and the per-unit price of abatement credits, 𝜌. In a subgame perfect
equilibrium, the regulator correctly anticipates these response functions.
A subgame perfect equilibrium is solved through backward induction. We therefore begin our
analysis with the second stage of the game, i.e., the WQT market. In a WQT market, NPS 𝑗 takes
𝛽𝑗 , 𝑎
¯𝑗 , and 𝜌 as given and chooses its abatement eﬀort 𝑎𝑗 to minimize its cost of participating in
the market, i.e.,11
min
𝑎𝑗

𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑗 (𝑎𝑗 ) − 𝜌𝜏𝑗 [𝑎𝑗 − 𝑎
¯𝑗 ],

𝑗 = 1, 2

where 𝐶𝑗 (𝑎𝑗 ) is 𝑗’s abatement cost function (increasing and convex in 𝑎𝑗 ) and 𝜏𝑗 is 𝑗’s corresponding
delivery ratio (i.e., transfer coeﬃcient or conveyance loss). This problem results in “modiﬁed
optimality conditions” for a competitive ambient permit market, where the modiﬁcation is due to
the appearance of the regulator’s cost-share rates, 𝛽𝑗 , directly in the NPSs’ respective ﬁrst-order
conditions,
[
𝛽𝑗

∂𝐶𝑗
∂𝑎𝑗

]
= 𝜌𝜏𝑗 ,

𝑗 = 1, 2

(1)

The point source 𝑃 similarly chooses its abatement eﬀort 𝑎𝑃 to minimize its cost of market participation,
min
𝑎𝑃

𝐶𝑃 (𝑎𝑃 ) − 𝜌𝜏𝑃 [𝑎𝑃 − 𝑎
¯𝑃 ]

resulting in corresponding optimality condition,
∂𝐶𝑃
= 𝜌𝜏𝑃 .
∂𝑎𝑃

(2)

Lastly, a market-clearing condition closes the solution,
𝐴¯ = 𝜏1 𝑎
¯1 + 𝜏2 𝑎
¯2 + 𝜏𝑃 𝑎
¯𝑃 ≤ 𝜏1 𝑎1 + 𝜏2 𝑎2 + 𝜏𝑃 𝑎𝑃

(3)

where 𝐴¯ is a receptor point’s pre-determined aggregate abatement necessary to meet the target
11

Parentheses denote a functional relationship, while square brackets indicate the application of a given operation
on the included variables.
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delivered load, e.g., as speciﬁed in Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL).12 Invoking the implicit
function theorem, the NPSs’ and point source’s equilibrium abatement eﬀorts, as well as the credit
price, may be written as 𝑎1 ≡ 𝑎1 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ), 𝑎2 ≡ 𝑎2 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ), 𝑎𝑃 ≡ 𝑎𝑃 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ), 𝜌 ≡ 𝜌(𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ).13
Associated comparative statics for the system of equations (??) – (??) result in
∂𝑎𝑗
∂𝑎𝑗
∂𝜌
< 0,
> 0,
> 0,
∂𝛽𝑗
∂𝛽𝑗
∂𝛽𝑖

𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2

(4)

In other words, an NPS’s abatement eﬀort is decreasing in its own cost-share percentage and
increasing in the cost-share percentage of the other NPS. This latter eﬀect results indirectly from
the positive relationship between an NPS’s cost-share percentage and the equilibrium credit price.
In the ﬁrst stage, the regulator chooses the NPSs’ respective cost-share rates 𝛽𝑗 and initial
allocations 𝑎
¯𝑗 to minimize its own cost-share obligation,

min

𝛽𝑗 ,¯
𝑎𝑗

[1 − 𝛽1 ]𝐶1 (𝑎1 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )) + [1 − 𝛽2 ]𝐶2 (𝑎2 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ))

subject to (??) and,

𝜏1 𝜌(𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )[𝑎1 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ) − 𝑎
¯1 ] − 𝛽1 𝐶1 (𝑎1 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )) ≥ 𝑁 𝐵1𝐴𝑙𝑡

(5)

𝜏2 𝜌(𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )[𝑎2 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ) − 𝑎
¯2 ] − 𝛽2 𝐶2 (𝑎2 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )) ≥ 𝑁 𝐵2𝐴𝑙𝑡

(6)

where 𝑁 𝐵𝑗𝐴𝑙𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑗 = 1, 2, represents the net beneﬁt of NPS 𝑗’s next-best alternative.14 Equations
(??) and (??) are the NPSs’ respective participation constraints, i.e., the necessary proﬁtability
12

In models where the regulator is precluded from setting initial abatement allocations, e.g., 𝑎
¯𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, 2, such as
in the ambient penalty models of Segerson (1988) and Horan et al. (1998), monitoring and enforcement of NPS
loads is essentially a non-issue. In contrast, the need for monitoring and enforcement in a WQT market would seem
to naturally arise. However, as pointed out by Ross and Associates Environmental Consulting, Ltd. (2000), WQT
is premised on the need for all parties to a trade (including the regulator itself) to agree on monitoring methods
and measured outcomes before the trade can be transacted. Thus, in practical terms, monitoring and enforcement
naturally occurs in WQT as a precursor to the trades themselves. We adopt this line of reasoning in our model by
not explicitly endowing the regulator with the authority to levy penalties for cheating on the part of the NPSs or the
point source. For a concise deﬁnition of TMDL see EPA (2011a).
13
For expository purposes, the delivery ratios 𝜏𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, 2, and 𝜏𝑃 , and TMDL aggregate abatement level 𝐴¯ are
subsumed in these implicit functions. The initial allocations 𝑎
¯𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, 2, and 𝑎
¯𝑃 aﬀect neither market price 𝜌 nor
abatement eﬀort at an interior solution (only the agents’ respective proﬁtabilities).
14
𝑁 𝐵𝑗𝐴𝑙𝑡 > 0 would need to hold in cases where NPS 𝑗 suﬀers a decrease in the proﬁtability of its agricultural
enterprise as a result of implementing a BMP, in which case revenues earned by participating as a seller in WQT
would need to exceed the cost of BMP implementation.

7

conditions that must be met before the NPSs will agree to participate in the WQT market with
abatement-cost subsidization. Letting 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 represent the Lagrangian multipliers on constraints
(??) and (??), respectively, and 𝜆 the Lagrangian multiplier on equation constraint (??), the
optimality conditions for the regulator’s problem are (??), (??), (??), and
[

]
[
]
∂𝐶1 (⋅) ∂𝑎1 (⋅)
∂𝐶2 (⋅) ∂𝑎2 (⋅)
𝐶1 (⋅) − [1 − 𝛽1 ]
= [1 − 𝛽2 ]
− 𝜇1 Ω11 − 𝜇2 Ω12
∂𝑎1 (⋅) ∂𝛽1
∂𝑎2 (⋅) ∂𝛽1

(7)

[

]
[
]
∂𝐶2 (⋅) ∂𝑎2 (⋅)
∂𝐶1 (⋅) ∂𝑎1 (⋅)
𝐶2 (⋅) − [1 − 𝛽2 ]
= [1 − 𝛽1 ]
− 𝜇1 Ω21 − 𝜇2 Ω22
∂𝑎2 (⋅) ∂𝛽2
∂𝑎1 (⋅) ∂𝛽2

(8)

𝜇1 = 𝜇2

(9)

and
[

]
[
]
[
]
∂𝐶1 (⋅) ∂𝑎1 (⋅)
∂𝜌(⋅)
∂𝑎1 (⋅)
Ω11 = 𝐶1 (⋅) + 𝛽1
− 𝜏1
[𝑎1 (⋅) − 𝑎
¯1 ] − 𝜌(⋅)𝜏1
∂𝑎1 (⋅) ∂𝛽1
∂𝛽1
∂𝛽1
]
]
]
[
[
[
∂𝐶2 (⋅) ∂𝑎2 (⋅)
∂𝜌(⋅)
∂𝑎2 (⋅)
Ω12 = 𝛽2
− 𝜏2
[𝑎2 (⋅) − 𝑎
¯2 ] − 𝜌(⋅)𝜏2
∂𝑎2 (⋅) ∂𝛽1
∂𝛽1
∂𝛽1
[
]
[
]
[
]
∂𝐶1 (⋅) ∂𝑎1 (⋅)
∂𝜌(⋅)
∂𝑎1 (⋅)
Ω21 = 𝛽1
− 𝜏1
[𝑎1 (⋅) − 𝑎
¯1 ] − 𝜌(⋅)𝜏1
∂𝑎1 (⋅) ∂𝛽2
∂𝛽2
∂𝛽2
[
]
[
]
[
]
∂𝐶2 (⋅) ∂𝑎2 (⋅)
∂𝜌(⋅)
∂𝑎2 (⋅)
Ω22 = 𝐶2 (⋅) + 𝛽2
− 𝜏2
[𝑎2 (⋅) − 𝑎
¯2 ] − 𝜌(⋅)𝜏2
.
∂𝑎2 (⋅) ∂𝛽2
∂𝛽2
∂𝛽2
One obvious corner solution to this problem would be to (1) provide zero subsidies to the NPSs,
i.e., set 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 1, (2) shift the entire initial abatement allocation to the point source, i.e., set
¯ 𝑃 , and, (3) given suﬃcient abatement-cost diﬀerences between the NPSs
𝑎
¯1 = 𝑎
¯2 = 0 and 𝑎
¯𝑃 = 𝐴/𝜏
and the point source, rely on the water quality market to generate proﬁts for the NPSs. This would
result in zero cost to the regulator. However, in the case of 𝑁 𝐵𝑗𝐴𝑙𝑡 > 0 for some 𝑗, relying solely
on WQT to generate the requisite proﬁt for unsubsidized NPSs may not ensure satisfaction of the
NPS participation constraints, e.g., if NPS 𝑗’s proﬁt generated through trading is not larger than
𝑁 𝐵𝑗𝐴𝑙𝑡 . More importantly, because we are explicitly investigating the relationship between WQT
and the subsidization of NPS abatement costs, we conﬁne our analysis to interior solutions.
Equations (??) and (??) solve for the regulator’s benchmark cost-share rates 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 , respectively, under full-information. The left-hand sides of these two equations represent the marginal
beneﬁts (in terms of reduced cost-share obligations for the regulator) associated with incremental
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increases in the respective 𝛽𝑗 s, while the right-hand sides represent the associated marginal costs.
For example, in equation (??) marginal beneﬁts accrue to the regulator through a reduction in NPS
1’s abatement cost, and thus in the attendant subsidy cost incurred by the regulator. In speciﬁc,
marginal beneﬁts occur through (1) a reduction in NPS 1’s abatement eﬀort (and thus its corresponding abatement cost, which in turn reduces the cost shared by the regulator), i.e., the term
[
]
1 (⋅) ∂𝑎1 (⋅)
[1 − 𝛽1 ] ∂𝐶
< 0, and (2) a direct reduction in the regulator’s share of NPS 1’s abatement
∂𝑎1 (⋅) ∂𝛽1
cost (i.e., the term 𝐶1 (⋅) > 0).15 Marginal costs consist of (1) a “cross-eﬀect” increase in the abate[
]
2 (⋅) ∂𝑎2 (⋅)
ment eﬀort (and corresponding abatement cost) of NPS 2 (i.e., the term [1 − 𝛽2 ] ∂𝐶
> 0)
∂𝑎2 (⋅) ∂𝛽1
and (2) the added net costs associated with changes in the proﬁtabilities of NPSs 1 and 2, and
thus the ability of the regulator to satisfy participation constraints (??) and (??), i.e. the terms
𝜇1 Ω11 and 𝜇2 Ω12 . Finally, equation (??) results from the regulator’s choice of the initial allocations
𝑎
¯𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, 2 and reﬂects the fact that the regulator values the participation of each NPS equally
on the margin. Solving equations (??) – (??) simultaneously establishes the ﬁrst-best benchmark,
(
)
¯∗𝑃 , 𝜌∗ , 𝜇∗1 , 𝜇∗2 , 𝜆∗ , 𝑗 = 1, 2.
characterized by the value set 𝛽1∗ , 𝛽2∗ , 𝑎∗𝑗 , 𝑎
¯∗𝑗 , 𝑎∗𝑃 , 𝑎

2.2

The Second-Best Problem

As alluded to earlier, uncertainty about the NPSs’ abatement costs limits the regulator’s ability
to implement the ﬁrst-best benchmark derived in Section 2.1. An additional type of uncertainty
pertains to the diﬀuse nature of NPS emissions and the whims of nature, which can aﬀect the
ultimate eﬀectiveness of any given level of abatement eﬀort implemented by an NPS. In other words,
abatement eﬀort at the source does not necessarily translate into a certain measured reduction in
concentration at the receptor point, due to environmental factors such as seasonal or weather-related
variations as well as the general limitations of hydrological and topographical data. To overcome
this type of uncertainty we have assumed that the regulator (1) selects the receptor point’s target
concentration 𝐴¯ with certainty (in accordance with a TMDL, as mentioned previously), (2) likewise
sets the NPSs’ respective delivery ratios, 𝜏𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, 2, and 𝜏𝑃 in accordance with accurate (albeit
probabilistic) scientiﬁc information, and (3) as importantly, communicates this information (along
15

There is a scaling issue associated with this direct-reduction eﬀect – with respect to the ﬁrst-order conditions for
both 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 – due to the fact that the 𝛽𝑗 s are measured in percentage terms and the abatement costs are measured
in (potentially large) dollar values. This issue is addressed in Section 3 by scaling 𝐶𝑗 (⋅), 𝑗 = 1, 2 in conditions (??)
and (??) each by a factor of 0.01 in order to reduce their values to a scale commensurate with that of the respective
𝛽𝑗 s.
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with 𝑎
¯𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, 2) to the NPSs. Recent research suggests that estimation of seasonal, ﬁeld-level
nutrient loadings and delivery ratios through the application of sophisticated hydrologic models
can provide “reasonable assurance” that TMDL standards can be met through WQT (Caplan, et
al., 2009; Horan, et al., 2002a and 2002b) and thus overcome the type of environmental uncertainty
explicitly modeled in Malik, et al. (1993) and Shortle and Horan (2001). In this way, the target
concentration and delivery ratios play similar roles as concentration standards in the Segerson
(1988) and Horan, et al. (1998) linear ambient tax models, and the communication of tax schedules
in the Shortle and Dunn (1986) management-practices models.
The uncertainty left unresolved in this paper pertains to an NPS’s ability to misrepresent itself,
i.e., to “hide” information from the regulator with respect to whether it is able to abate at high
or low cost. For instance, if a low-cost NPS believes the regulator’s cost-share rule is monotone in
abatement costs (i.e., NPSs with higher abatement cost functions tend to receive higher subsidy
rates) the NPS may have incentive to misrepresent itself as high cost in order to receive a lower
𝛽𝑗 and 𝑎
¯𝑗 .16 To capture the potential eﬀect of this hidden information, we introduce standard
probability parameters (i.e., odds ratios) 𝜋𝑗 > 0, 𝑗 = 1, 2, which represents the regulator’s estimate
of the (relative) likelihood that NPS 𝑗 is indeed providing the regulator with its true abatement
cost information; information the regulator then uses to set NPS 𝑗’s 𝛽𝑗 and 𝑎
¯𝑗 .
To further motivate our analysis, we assume that NPS 1 is a low-cost producer of abatement
and NPS 2 is a high-cost producer, i.e., 𝐶2 (𝑎) > 𝐶1 (𝑎) for any common abatement level 𝑎. Further,
the diﬀerence in costs abides by the single-crossing property, i.e.,
∂𝐶2 (𝑎)
∂𝐶1 (𝑎)
>
∂𝑎
∂𝑎

(10)

for any common 𝑎. Thus, not only is NPS 2’s abatement cost everywhere larger than NPS 1’s, but
it also increases at a faster rate. In addition to being a standard assumption in hidden-information
models of the type developed here (see Varian, 1992), the single-crossing property is reﬂective of the
underlying presumption – ﬁrst mentioned in Section 1 – of divergence between the NPSs’ abatement
costs.
16
For simplicity we assume that each NPS has only two possible abatement cost schedules – its own and that of the
other NPS. Assuming the NPSs have wider cost spaces would unnecessarily complicate the ensuing analysis without
adding much by way of insight. This is a common approach to modeling the hidden information problem. See Varian
(1992) and Hart and Holmstrom (1987) for further discussion.
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As a result of the regulator’s choices in the ﬁrst stage, the NPSs are subsequently induced
to portray themselves truthfully. Truthful revelation occurs as a result of the regulator satisfying
both the participation and incentive-compatibility constraints in its ﬁrst-stage problem (see below).
Thus, NPS 𝑗’s (as well as point source 𝑃 ’s) cost minimization problem in the second stage of its
game with the regulator is identical to that described in Section 2.1. The resulting optimality
conditions are (??) – (??), which again characterize the second-stage WQT market equilibrium.
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the regulator again chooses the NPSs’ respective cost-share rates
𝛽𝑗 and initial allocations 𝑎
¯𝑗 to minimize its cost-share obligation,17

min

𝛽𝑗 ,¯
𝑎𝑗

𝜋1 [1 − 𝛽1 ]𝐶1 (𝑎1 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )) + 𝜋2 [1 − 𝛽2 ]𝐶2 (𝑎2 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ))

subject to (??) – (??), (??), (??), and,

𝜏1 𝜌(𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )[𝑎1 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ) − 𝑎
¯1 ] − 𝛽1 𝐶1 (𝑎1 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )) ≥

𝜏1 𝜌(𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )[𝑎2 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ) − 𝑎
¯2 ] − 𝛽2 𝐶1 (𝑎2 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ))

(11)

𝜏2 𝜌(𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )[𝑎2 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ) − 𝑎
¯2 ] − 𝛽2 𝐶2 (𝑎2 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )) ≥
𝜏2 𝜌(𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )[𝑎1 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ) − 𝑎
¯1 ] − 𝛽1 𝐶2 (𝑎1 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ))

(12)

where we henceforth assume 𝑁 𝐵1𝐴𝑙𝑡 = 𝑁 𝐵2𝐴𝑙𝑡 ≥ 0.18 Equations (??) and (??) are standard selfselection (or incentive-compatibility) constraints. For example, constraint (??) states that costshares 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are chosen such that the proﬁt NPS 1 obtains from adopting its true (low-cost)
level of abatement eﬀort is never less than the proﬁt it would obtain by adopting NPS 2’s true
(high-cost) abatement level (which NPS 1 would conceivably do if it thinks the added beneﬁts
associated with obtaining from the regulator 𝛽2 (rather than 𝛽1 ) and 𝑎
¯2 (rather than 𝑎
¯1 ) outweigh
the added costs associated with the higher-cost level of abatement). Constraint (??) does likewise
17

We follow Varian (1992) and Mas-Colell et al. (1995) by retaining the odds ratios in the regulator’s objective
function. Since we ultimately assume the regulator is able to simultaneously satisfy both the participation and
incentive-compatibility constraints (introduced below), the odds ratios essentially become superﬂuous to this problem.
In other words, by the Revelation Principle if incentive compatibility constraints are satisﬁed, truth-telling is the
dominant strategy and thus there is no randomness remaining in the regulator’s objective function. See Baron and
Myerson (1982) for a discussion of the Revelation Principle.
18
The assumption of equally valued next-best alternatives simpliﬁes the ensuing analysis without qualitatively
changing the results in this section, as well as the numerical results in Section 3.
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for NPS 2.19
To begin, we compare constraints (??) and (??). Using (??), and the fact that NPS 1(2) is
low(high) cost, we see that when

𝜏1 𝜌(𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )[𝑎2 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ) − 𝑎
¯2 ] − 𝛽2 𝐶1 (𝑎2 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )) ≥
𝜏2 𝜌(𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )[𝑎2 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ) − 𝑎
¯2 ] − 𝛽2 𝐶2 (𝑎2 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )) ≥ 𝑁 𝐵2𝐴𝑙𝑡 = 𝑁 𝐵1𝐴𝑙𝑡 ≥ 0,
e.g., when 𝜏1 ≥ 𝜏2 , constraint (??) does not bind, implying that constraint (??) does.20 By contrast,
when conditions are such that (??) does not bind, then as long as constraint (??) binds and 𝜏2 > 𝜏1
by a suﬃcient amount, constraint (??) will bind as well.
We can compare constraints (??) and (??) in a similar manner. Again assuming (??) binds, it
can be substituted to (??) resulting in,
𝛽2 𝜏2 𝐶1 (𝑎2 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )) 𝛽1 𝜏2 𝐶1 (𝑎1 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ))
−
≥ 𝛽2 𝐶2 (𝑎2 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 )) − 𝛽1 𝐶2 (𝑎1 (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ))
𝜏1
𝜏1
By condition (??), and for (1) inequality 𝑎1 (⋅) > 𝑎2 (⋅) (which, for small enough diﬀerences between
𝜏1 and 𝜏2 , is a natural outcome given 𝐶2 (𝑎) > 𝐶1 (𝑎) for any 𝑎) and (2) similarly small enough
diﬀerences between 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 , constraint (??) does not bind (implying that (??) binds). This
particular result – where (??) and (??) are the binding constraints – is common in the hiddeninformation literature (e.g., Varian, 1992; Mas-Colell, et al., 1995). Here, it indicates that the
regulator chooses 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 such that (1) the high-cost NPS just obtains its reservation proﬁt
(which nonetheless satisﬁes its incentive-compatibility constraint slack), and (2) the low-cost NPS
receives more than its reservation proﬁt (but still a proﬁt level that just satisﬁes its incentivecompatibility constraint). For this particular case, therefore, we obtain a system of equations that
includes the regulator’s ﬁrst-stage optimality conditions, equations (??) – (??), binding constraints
19

Note that for this problem we do not have 𝜌(𝛽2 , 𝛽2 ) and 𝑎2 (𝛽2 , 𝛽2 ) on the right-hand side of (??) because these
reaction functions must nevertheless account for the responses of 𝜌 and 𝑎2 in the WQT market to the regulator’s
previous choices of 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 in the ﬁrst stage of the game. Likewise with respect to not having 𝜌(𝛽1 , 𝛽1 and 𝑎1 (𝛽1 , 𝛽1 )
on the right-hand side of (??).
20
Note that 𝜏1 ≥ 𝜏2 is suﬃcient but not necessary for the above inequality to hold.
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(??) and (??), and

21

]
[
]
∂𝐶2 (⋅) ∂𝑎2 (⋅)
∂𝐶1 (⋅) ∂𝑎1 (⋅)
= 𝜋2 [1 − 𝛽2 ]
− 𝜇1 Ψ11 − 𝜇2 Ψ12
𝜋1 𝐶1 (⋅) − 𝜋1 [1 − 𝛽1 ]
∂𝑎1 (⋅) ∂𝛽1
∂𝑎2 (⋅) ∂𝛽1
[

[
𝜋2 𝐶2 (⋅) − 𝜋2 [1 − 𝛽2 ]

]
[
]
∂𝐶2 (⋅) ∂𝑎2 (⋅)
∂𝐶1 (⋅) ∂𝑎1 (⋅)
= 𝜋1 [1 − 𝛽1 ]
− 𝜇1 Ψ21 − 𝜇2 Ψ22
∂𝑎2 (⋅) ∂𝛽2
∂𝑎1 (⋅) ∂𝛽2
𝜇2 =

𝜏2 𝜇1
𝜏1 + 𝜏2

(13)

(14)
(15)

where 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 now represent the multipliers on constraints (??) and (??), respectively, and
[
Ψ11 = −𝛽2

[
[
]
]
]
∂𝐶2 (⋅) ∂𝑎2 (⋅)
∂𝜌(⋅)
∂𝑎2 (⋅)
+ 𝜏2
[𝑎2 (⋅) − 𝑎
¯2 ] + 𝜌(⋅)𝜏2
∂𝑎2 (⋅) ∂𝛽1
∂𝛽1
∂𝛽1
[

]
[
]
[
]
∂𝐶1 (⋅) ∂𝑎1 (⋅)
∂𝜌(⋅)
∂𝑎1 (⋅)
Ψ12 = −𝐶1 (⋅) − 𝛽1
− 𝜏1
[𝑎2 (⋅) − 𝑎
¯2 ] + 𝜌(⋅)𝜏1
∂𝑎1 (⋅) ∂𝛽1
∂𝛽1
∂𝛽1
[
]
[
]
[
]
∂𝜌(⋅)
∂𝑎2 (⋅)
∂𝐶1 (⋅) ∂𝑎2 (⋅)
+𝜏1
[𝑎1 (⋅) − 𝑎
¯1 ] − 𝜌(⋅)𝜏1
+ 𝛽2
∂𝛽1
∂𝛽1
∂𝑎2 (⋅) ∂𝛽1
]
[
]
[
]
[
∂𝜌(⋅)
∂𝑎2 (⋅)
∂𝐶2 (⋅) ∂𝑎2 (⋅)
+ 𝜏2
[𝑎2 (⋅) − 𝑎
¯2 ] + 𝜌(⋅)𝜏2
− 𝑠𝐶2 (⋅)
Ψ21 = −𝛽2
∂𝑎2 (⋅) ∂𝛽2
∂𝛽2
∂𝛽2
[
]
[
]
[
]
∂𝐶1 (⋅) ∂𝑎1 (⋅)
∂𝜌(⋅)
∂𝑎1 (⋅)
Ψ22 = 𝐶1 (⋅) − 𝛽1
− 𝜏1
[𝑎2 (⋅) − 𝑎
¯2 ] + 𝜌(⋅)𝜏1
∂𝑎1 (⋅) ∂𝛽2
∂𝛽2
∂𝛽2
[
]
[
]
[
]
∂𝜌(⋅)
∂𝑎2 (⋅)
∂𝐶1 (⋅) ∂𝑎2 (⋅)
+𝜏1
[𝑎1 (⋅) − 𝑎
¯1 ] − 𝜌(⋅)𝜏1
+ 𝛽2
∂𝛽2
∂𝛽2
∂𝑎2 (⋅) ∂𝛽2
Solving equations (??) – (??), binding (??) and (??), and (??) – (??) simultaneously establishes this
(
)
particular second-best outcome, characterized by the value set 𝛽1′ , 𝛽2′ , 𝑎′𝑗 , 𝑎
¯′𝑗 , 𝑎′𝑃 , 𝑎
¯′𝑃 , 𝜌′ , 𝜇′1 , 𝜇′2 , 𝜆′ , 𝑗 =
1, 2, where 𝜆′ is the multiplier on constraint (??). Note that (??) is consistent with the low-cost
NPS receiving an informational rent from the regulator, since the added cost to the regulator of
allowing high-cost NPS 2 to exceed its reservation proﬁt level (i.e., 𝜇1 ) is larger than the added
cost of allowing low-cost NPS 1 to exceed its incentive-compatible proﬁt level (i.e., 𝜇2 ).
To see this particular result more clearly, we now turn to numerical simulations of the basic
model. As shown in the next section, these simulations are based on simple functional forms for the
NPSs’ and point source’s abatement cost functions. The numerical simulations also consider cases
21
As with conditions (??) and (??) in Section 2.1, the direction-reduction eﬀects in conditions (??) and (??), i.e.,
the 𝜋1 𝐶1 and 𝜋2 𝐶2 terms, are ultimately scaled by a factor of 0.01 for the numerical simulations in Section 3.
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where other sets of constraints are binding besides (??) and (??). Thus, we are able to distinguish
a unique second-best benchmark for the numerical model.

3

Numerical Simulations

In order to simulate possible equilibrium outcomes under full and incomplete information, we
assume the following abatement cost functions for NPSs 1 and 2 and point source 𝑃 , respectively,22

𝐶1 (𝑎1 ) =

𝑎21
2

𝐶2 (𝑎2 ) =

2𝑎22
3

𝐶𝑃 (𝑎𝑃 ) = 𝑎2𝑃
Thus, NPS 2(1) is high(low) cost and condition (??) is duly satisﬁed. Table 1 contains the various
parameter values for our initial and alternative simulation exercises. Note that for the initial
simulation we assume that NPS 1 is located “downstream” from NPS 2 vis-a-vis the receptor
point, i.e., 𝜏1 = 1 > 𝜏2 = 0.95, and that the relative likelihoods of each NPS choosing to abate
according to their true abatement costs are each equal to 2, i.e., 𝜋1 = 𝜋2 = 2.23 Results for the
ﬁrst- and second-best scenarios for this initial simulation are presented in Table 2.
For the ﬁrst-best benchmark, note from Table 2 that NPS 2 receives a slightly lower subsidy in
percentage terms, i.e., it shares 51% of its abatement cost with the regulator while NPS 1 shares
49% of its cost. These cost-share rates are generally higher than the typical EQIP cost-share rates
reported by the NRCS, which range between 25 and 40 percent (i.e., between 60 and 75 percent
when deﬁning the rate as percentage of cost incurred by the NRCS)(NRCS, 2011a and 2011b). In
contrast, NPS 2 receives a lower initial abatement allocation (24 units vs. NPS 1’s 37 units). As a
result of WQT, NPS 1 abates more than NPS 2 (79 units vs. 54 units). The excess of abatement
22

GAMS IDE version 2.0.20.0 is used to generate the simulations. Copies of the input code are available upon
request from the author.
23
Recall from Section 2.2 that unambiguous analytical results for the second-best solution depend on suﬃciently
small diﬀerences between 𝜏1 and 𝜏2 . We nevertheless perform sensitivity analysis on the values of 𝜏𝑗 in order to
test the stability of our simulations. Also, we assume that the regulator has access to enough information about the
NPSs’ respective abatement cost functions to be relatively conﬁdent about which NPS is which, as evidenced by the
relatively large values assumed for 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 , e.g., the regulator believes that NPS 1 is two times as likely to identify
itself as NPS 1 than is NPS 2 and vice-versa for NPS 2.
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over initial allocation obtained by each respective NPS is then sold to point source 𝑃 , so that 𝑃 can
eﬀectively meet its abatement allocation, i.e., (89.87 - 19.46) = (79.00 - 36.93) + (54.26 - 24.42).
The regulator eﬀectively ensures that each NPS’s surplus (i.e., proﬁt) from participating in WQT
equals the value of its next best alternative (i.e., participation constraints (??) and (??) bind).
However, point source 𝑃 obtains negative proﬁt (driven by its relatively large initial abatement
allocation and the fact that it does not receive a subsidy from the regulator).24 The total cost of
the subsidy program for the regulator amounts to approximately $2,540.
The third column of Table 2 contains the results for the second-best scenario. In reacting to
the uncertainties associated with NPS costs and abatement eﬀectiveness, the regulator maintains
its subsidization rate for NPS 1 and increases NPS 2’s (NPS 2’s cost-share falls from 51% to 48%).
In addition, the regulator shifts more of the initial abatement allocation toward point source 𝑃
(from 90 units in the ex post outcome to 98 units in the ex ante outcome). As a result, the initial
allocation to NPS 1 is reduced by more than the allocation is increased for NPS 2 (from 37 to 28
units for NPS 1 and from 24 to 26 units for NPS 2).25
Further, the pattern of trade in the permit market is altered. NPS 1(2) now abates less(more),
and the point source in turn abates slightly less itself. Although the equilibrium permit price is
slightly lower, the negative proﬁt incurred by the point source is now larger (from approximately
-$3,100 to -$3,400). Although NPS 2’s proﬁt is constrained to equal the value of its next-best
alternative, NPS 1, being the low-cost NPS, is able to extract a rent from the regulator worth
approximately $316. Finally, the regulator’s total cost rises, from approximately $2,540 in the
second-best scenario to $2,630 in the ﬁrst-best scenario, indicating an “informational cost” to the
regulator of approximately $90, or only 4%.
As indicated in Table 1, we test the stability of the simulation model by examining an alternative scenario where the NPSs’ respective delivery ratios are reversed, i.e., NPS 2 is now located
downstream from NPS 1. Table 3 reports the results. Due to the ambiguity associated with the
second-best outcome for the case of 𝜏2 > 𝜏1 (as discussed in Section 2.2), we have solved the regulator’s ﬁrst-stage problem for each of the three combinations of constraints that the regulator could
24
Note that the regulator is precluded from simply assigning the entire initial abatement allocation 𝐴¯ to point
source 𝑃 because of the binding participation constraints for both NPSs. This preclusion is also evident in the
second-best scenario discussed below, where only NPS 2’s participation constraint binds.
25
Thus, the regulator in eﬀect compensates NPS 1 for not having received a decrease in its cost share with a larger
decrease in its initial abatement allocation.
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conceivably face, and have then selected the solution corresponding to the lowest total abatement
cost. The three constraint combinations are represented by equations {(??),(??)}, {(??),(??)}, and
{(??),(??)}. As demonstrated in Section 2.2, the constraints included in combinations {(??),(??)}
and {(??),(??)} cannot hold simultaneously. In addition, the constraint combination {(??),(??)}
is incompatible with the regulator’s choices of 𝑎
¯𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, 2 (a proof of this result is available from
the authors upon request). In our case, constraint set {(??),(??)} results in the lowest total cost
of regulation for the regulator and is therefore considered the set of binding constraints for the
second-best solution to this problem.
Comparing the ﬁrst-best results in Table 3 with those in Table 2, we see that the resulting
equilibrium changes only slightly in response to the changes in the delivery ratios. In relative
terms, all of the results obtained for the initial ﬁrst-best equilibrium are retained in this alternative
equilibrium, e.g., NPS 2 receives a slightly lower subsidy in percentage terms than NPS 1, as well
as a lower initial abatement allocation.
However, with respect to the second-best equilibrium, the changes are more pronounced. Although NPS 1’s cost-share rate stays constant at 48%, NPS 2’s increases to 52% (or, alternatively
stated, its subsidy rate falls from 57% to 48%). In concert with these rates, NPS 1’s(2’s) abatement
allocation rises(falls) from 34(27) to 36(26) units. Thus, although NPS 2’s loadings are now relatively more potent than NPS 1’s (due to 𝜏2 > 𝜏1 ), and thus, all else equal, it is more cost eﬀective
to encourage more abatement from NPS 2, the regulator nevertheless balances a lower abatement
allocation for NPS 2 with a lower subsidy rate. By eliminating NPS 1’s rent payment, which is a
consequence of constraint (??) now binding (rather than (??)), the regulator is able to reduce its
total cost to $2,591, which is now only slightly larger than the ﬁrst-best benchmark of $2,573.

4

Summary

This paper has examined how a regulatory authority might consider subsidizing the participation of
nonpoint sources (through a cost-sharing arrangement) in the surplus-generating economic activity
of water quality trading. Toward this end, the subgame-perfect equilibrium concept is adopted to
model the “multilateral contracting” relationship between the regulatory authority and the nonpoint sources when the regulator has incomplete information about the nonpoint sources’ respective
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abatement costs. We derive analytical expressions for ﬁrst-best allocations in the presence of regulator uncertainty regarding these costs. The extent to which the ﬁrst-best allocation is constrained
by asymmetric information concerning the nonpoint sources’ costs is also demonstrated analytically.
In numerical analysis we ﬁnd that the regulator reacts to its problem of incomplete information
by increasing its cost-share ratios and, in some cases, providing additional rent to the low-cost
nonpoint source. It also shifts more of the required abatement to the point source, for which there
is no asymmetric information problem. As a result, the overall cost of regulation increases relative
to the ﬁrst-best benchmark.
Our results suggest that a cost-sharing arrangement in the presence of incomplete information
about an nonpoint sources’ abatement costs can successfully be coupled with the development of a
market within which the nonpoint sources are able to generate surplus through trading abatement
credits with one another and with point sources. In cases where the nonpoint sources can voluntarily
decide whether to enter the cost-sharing arrangement with the regulator, such as for the control of
nonpoint pollution, the development of such a market may be a strong enough inducement for the
nonpoint sources to enter the cost-sharing arrangement in the ﬁrst place.
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Table 1: Parameter Values for Simulations of First- and Second-Best Scenarios.
Parameter

Initial Value

Alternative Value

𝐴¯

150

150

𝜏1

1

0.95

𝜏2

0.95

1

𝜏𝑃

1

1

100

100

2

2

𝑁 𝐵1𝐴𝑙𝑡 = 𝑁 𝐵2𝐴𝑙𝑡
𝜋1 = 𝜋2
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Table 2: Results for Initial Simulation of First- and Second-Best Scenarios.
Variable
𝛽1
𝛽2
𝑎
¯1
𝑎
¯2
𝑎
¯𝑃
𝑎1
𝑎2
𝑎𝑃
𝜌
𝑃 𝑟𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑡1
𝑃 𝑟𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑡2
𝑃 𝑟𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑡𝑃
𝜇1
𝜇2
𝜆
Total Cost to Regulator ((1 − 𝛽1 )𝐶1 (⋅) + (1 − 𝛽2 )𝐶2 (⋅))
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First-Best

Second-Best

0.49
0.51
36.93
24.42
89.87
79.00
54.26
19.46
38.91
100
100
-3,118.20
0.35
0.35
13.73

0.49
0.48
27.51
25.69
98.08
76.93
56.92
19.01
38.01
416.26
100
-3,367.16
1.06
0.52
19.63

2,543.43

2,628.59

Table 3: Results for Alternative Simulation of First- and Second-Best Scenarios.
Variable
𝛽1
𝛽2
𝑎
¯1
𝑎
¯2
𝑎
¯𝑃
𝑎1
𝑎2
𝑎𝑃
𝜌
𝑃 𝑟𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑡1
𝑃 𝑟𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑡2
𝑃 𝑟𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑡𝑃
𝜇1
𝜇2
𝜆
Total Cost to Regulator ((1 − 𝛽1 )𝐶1 (⋅) + (1 − 𝛽2 )𝐶2 (⋅))
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First-Best

Second-Best

0.49
0.51
35.65
26.21
89.93
76.64
57.49
19.70
39.40
100
100
-3,155.10
0.39
0.39
15.46

0.48
0.52
36.20
25.70
89.91
77.75
56.50
19.64
39.27
100
100
-3,145.35
0.41
0.41
16.23

2,573.37

2,591.08

